

Arthur B. Darling Interviews:

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Montague, L. L. Interviews and Conversations

He came to the Central Intelligence Group at its beginning from McCormack's staff in the State Department. Montague had been Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then representative of "G-2" among the senior members of the Joint Intelligence Staff. It was there in December 1944 that he took significant part with Lay, Gleason, and others in preparing the two plans for the Joint Intelligence Committee. Under Admiral Souers as the first Director of Central Intelligence Montague assisted in drafting the first directives of the National Intelligence Authority and became head of the Central Reports Staff. It was he who set up the Office of Research and Evaluation for General Vandenberg and produced "ONE-1." Then as head of the Global Survey Group Montague was most active in the Office of Reports and Estimates and went from it to the National Estimates Board in the new Office of National Estimates.

February 15, 1952

My first inquiries were about the Donovan plan as it was submitted with the proposals of the Joint Intelligence Committee before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Montague remembered that the opposition to Donovan's plan came from both personal animus and institutional bias. These seemed to be the chief elements in the opposition. On their merits, however, three other arguments entered the controversy. One was that the central organization

The  
Donovan  
Plan

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should not have separate collection. Another was that the organization should not engage in subversive practices with its collection and analysis of intelligence. The third was that the Director should not be immediately responsible to the President. It of course was Donovan's firm conviction that the Director should not be separated from the President by any board or committee.

Discussion  
in the  
Joint  
Intelligence  
Staff

Members of the Joint Intelligence Staff were dissatisfied with the Joint Intelligence Committee as an estimating board. They discussed the matter among themselves frequently and finally decided to put their ideas on paper. It appears that James S. Lay, Jr established the definitions in what became known as JIS 89. Then Max Ways, representative of the Foreign Economic Administration, and Everett Gleason, representative of "OSS," drafted the principles of what became known as the "civilian plan." Gleason sent a memorandum of it to Donovan. Montague himself, as General Bissell's representative on the Staff, was obliged by his position to work out a plan for the Armed Services. Apparently his heart was not in it and subsequent events allowed him to join with the others in supporting a modified form of the "civilian plan."

The  
121st  
Meeting

The famous 121st meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee on December 22, 1944 was necessary to show to the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the chiefs of intelligence from the respective services, the difficulties which the Joint Intelligence Staff was having with the problem of central

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General  
Bissell

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intelligence. General Bissell was not convinced after all had been said in that meeting. But it seems likely that he understood what was happening for he instructed Montague to help the others perfect their plan. Result in short order was what became known as JIC 239/5, the plan for a central intelligence organization which went eventually to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then reappeared in the fall of 1945 as the Office of Strategic Services came to its end.

The Idea  
of the  
Board

I asked Montague who it was that had the original idea of making the Secretaries of the Departments serve as a board of authority. He did not remember that any one person came up with the original idea. His hypothesis was that they all were representatives of some Department or agency. That was the nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was the federal principle. As a practical matter, of course, no one wanted a single Department to monopolize, and so all of them thought it logical for them to cooperate as a "whole."

Defense  
of the  
Joint  
Intelligence  
Committee's  
Estimating

Montague defended the Joint Intelligence Committee as an estimating board. Besides the Armed Services, the Department of State, the Federal Economic Administration, and the Office of Strategic Services had representation in the Committee. Estimating was its function during the war and military estimating under such conditions was relatively easy. Political matters caused "split papers." Unanimity was not the "rule" for the Committee's procedure. But the Joint Chiefs, said Montague, did not like to have

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split papers come up to them. The effort therefore seems to have been to reduce dissents to the minimum. He thought of the situation as requiring control by a majority. He understood, however, that the hope was to obtain eventually unanimous opinions.

February 29, 1952

The  
Warner  
Plan

Dir  
collections

I called Montague on the telephone today to inquire about the so-called Warner plan for reorganizing the Joint Intelligence Committee to bring the Research and Analysis Branch of "OSS" into close relation with "G-2" and "ONI." Montague could not recall much of the Warner plan but he did remember that there was a committee of some sort in the fall of 1942 and that it worked into the following spring. I had talked with Mr. Buford in the State Department on the preceding day. Buford could not recall detail but he remembered, he thought, that General Strong (G-2) had never considered the plan seriously. Montague had just seen General Fortier who had been connected with the Joint Intelligence Committee during the war. Fortier also recalled that G-2 did not think much of "R & A." Fortier, however, said that his recollection was quite dim. I gathered from these remarks of all three that "R & A" had the reputation of not being worth much, certainly not enough for the Army and Navy to want to take it over. [As I look this interview over for inclusion in the Historical Collection I recall that General Magruder had a different view of the Warner plan. See Chapter I, pages 23-25, and his interview of November 18, 1952.]

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April 1, 1952

Cited Darling  
I/19 (2) II/44;  
II/54 (3) III/5

This conference was concerned for the most part with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group and its Central Reports Staff. I showed Montague the first roster of the Staff. This recalled for him the difficulty which he had in apportioning his personnel among the several Services as required by the concept of the Group. The problem was too intricate and time-wasting. Moreover, after delay almost beyond endurance he could not have often the right people of the right place. However good in theory, the idea of apportionment among the Services and requisition for the Group was mistaken. Montague's experience was an argument that the Agency should have the right to "hire and fire" which Vandenberg demanded when he came to office as the second Director of Central Intelligence.

I asked Montague then about the Council of the Group. He said that there had been nothing like it in the Agency since that time. Admiral Souers had wished that his Assistant Directors should become a real council. He presented matters of policy for their deliberation. Today, said Montague, although there are regular meetings of the Assistant Directors there is no such use of them as Souers intended. Vandenberg brought his "kitchen cabinet" with him. These officers gave him advice. He did not consult his Assistant Directors of the purpose.

Failure  
of  
apportionment

Personnel

Souers'  
Council  
in the  
Group

Vandenberg's  
"Kitchen  
Cabinet"

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Fortier

I asked what were the functions of Colonel Fortier as the chief of operational services. Montague replied that until "SSW" was turned over to the Group by Magruder, Colonel Fortier did not have much of a job, and then when Vandenberg arrived with his own staff, Fortier did not remain much longer in the Group. I further inquired if much of the personnel and facilities for subversive activities had been brought over to the Group from "OSS" by way of the Strategic Services Unit. Montague did not know. If there was an attempt to perpetuate those functions of "OSS" it was kept very secret.

Facilities  
for  
Subversion

Plan  
for  
Departmental  
Representatives  
in the  
Central Reports  
Staff

We discussed then the plan to have each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board designate one of his staff as an assistant to the head of the Central Reports Staff to serve with him "full time" in making reports and estimates. The assistant to the head of CRS would still be responsible to the member of the Intelligence Advisory Board, not to the Director of Central Intelligence. Montague said that it was his own proposal from his experience in a similar situation as a member of the Joint Intelligence Staff under the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today in "ONE," they do not have such permanent interdepartmental membership but these fellows who come from the Army, Navy and State Department sit in task forces of "ONE" and discuss the construction of National Intelligence Estimates. Each reports then to someone higher up in his own organization who in turn reports to the chief of intelligence in

Estimating

the Procedure  
in  
"ONE"

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that service. These persons in between apparently make up their minds whether they should advise the chief of intelligence to concur or to dissent. The chief himself has not been in the conference nor has the intermediary officer. The junior officers who come to "ONE" and participate in the discussions are simply carriers. It was Montague's opinion that it would be better to have the representatives of the "IAC" agencies on permanent and "full time" assignment to the Office of National Estimates. This was what he had in mind he said in the spring of 1946.

Our discussion had led Montague to remark somewhere along the way that in his opinion William H. Jackson has one of the loosest conceptions of what a national estimate is. There were about six different conceptions going the rounds. I have met four variations so far, Kent's, Houston's, Jackson's and Montague's. They all seem to vary primarily with respect to the meaning of "coordinate."

The administrative order of March 4, 1946 officially activating the Central Reports Staff simply caught up with Montague and his associates. They had been at work since approximately February 13. He had tried to produce an "estimate" immediately but, he said, it was hardly worth the name. It was little more than a daily report. His problem in those first weeks was to obtain personnel. He was not able really to set up his estimates branch before Souers left and Vandenberg arrived.

Loose  
Conceptions  
of  
National  
Estimates

No  
Estimating  
in  
"CRS"



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Montague  
in  
"ORE"

Huddle  
and  
his  
Deputies

The  
Intelligence  
Staff

With the advent of Vandenberg and his plan for a large "ORE," Montague found himself, though still head of the "Reports Staff," subordinated to Mr. Huddle who was brought from the Department of State. The theory was that since the Department was a policy-making body the head of the new Office of Research and Evaluation in the Group should be headed by a member of the State Department. Montague himself had been in the Department, but for only a couple of months; worse yet, he had been a "McCormack man." Montague's work in the Joint Intelligence Staff and before that the Joint Intelligence Committee did not seem to have been considered adequate experience for estimating, so I thought as I listened to this story. The fact was however that during the war real estimating had been done in the Joint Intelligence Committee. Montague's difficulty now was political; he was not enough of a "State man" so that he could be head of "ORE." He was too much of a "State man" to be deputy, and so a Captain McCollum came from the Navy to be deputy to Mr. Huddle. But Huddle asked Montague to continue to do the work as his deputy in charge of estimating at the head of the Reports Staff now called the Intelligence Staff.

To show me how a bureaucracy works, Montague went on with evident amusement to say that subordinate personnel who had been very deferential to him when he was head of the Central Reports Staff and called Assistant Director now found him quite inadequate in the very same job. Montague asked Mr. Huddle if he were still Huddle's deputy as he had said. The answer was yes.

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Montague then asked if Muddle had told anyone else besides himself. Muddle said no. Why not, asked Montague? Because he did not want to cause trouble. I asked how long Mr. Muddle stayed in the Group. He was there nearly a year and then went over seas in some diplomatic post for the State Department. Then Babbitt became head of "ONE." Montague, Van Slyck, and others continued to function as the "Global Survey Group."

We turned then to a discussion of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. The accompanying paper is a copy of the memorandum which Montague made for Kent recently to distinguish the British Committee from the Central Intelligence Agency and also the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

International  
Estimating

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As he was leaving Montague let me take for my studies his "Souvenirs of JIC-CIG" and "Souvenirs of G/CS."

April 11, 1952

*Cited Darling III/ IV/54 (3)*

The first topic of discussion today was the "Defense

Lovell's  
Defense  
Project

Project" which Colonel Lovell started in the Pentagon during the spring of 1946 to provide as quickly as possible as much intelligence as could be obtained with regard to the Soviet Union. I asked Montague if Lovell's activity were encroaching upon the Central Reports Staff. Montague said no. The Staff was equipped only to do the "Daily Summary" at that time. Then we talked about his own difficulties with the Central Planning Staff which

\* Undated memo<sup>pres</sup> To 1 Apr 52, entitled "Enclosure" filed in H.S. files and

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undertook to advise the Reports Staff upon its organization.

The  
Central  
Planning  
Staff

Montague was irked then and doubtless still is but his recollection of the Central Reports Staff today is that when Vandenberg came he decided to break up the Planning Staff. Its members were put up at "auction." Montague felt that the net result of the Planning Staff's effort had been nothing.

The Council

We referred again to the Council. Souers turned it over to Douglass and absented himself from its meetings most of the time.

Edgar  
and  
"ICAPS"

Donald Edgar, who became the head of Vandenberg's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, said Montague, came to the Group as the "personal representative" of the Secretary of State. This was the impression at least which Edgar gave to Montague and others in the Group. Edgar proceeded at once to build "ICAPS" into an even more active institution within the Group than the Central Planning Staff had been.

April 18, 1952

"WIA 1"  
Capabilities  
and  
Intentions

I had just come upon the fact that the clause in the draft of "WIA 1" regarding the capabilities and intentions of the United States (Article 7) had been left out of the directive in its final form. Knowing that Montague was one of those who had framed the directive I therefore asked him why it was that Lay and he and Souers had done so. Montague's reply was that probably they were "shooting for the moon" when they included the provision

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Departmental  
Opposition

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in the draft. The hope was that they might be able to persuade the departmental chiefs of intelligence and the Secretaries to accept the provision. They had included the provision because as members of the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee during the war they were experienced in trying to make estimates. They knew that they could hardly estimate with regard to the enemy's intentions without knowing something about the abilities of their own country and its intentions. Montague recalled that Souers was extremely sensitive to opposition in the Armed Services and rightly so, said Montague. Possibly when Souers got wind of the possibility that there might be opposition to the clause he withdrew it without any further comment. According to Montague the slightest breath of opposition might have overturned the Group at the moment. Anyway, the clause did not survive the first draft.

Souers'  
Withdrawal

May 22, 1952

Montague's Plan  
and the  
Advisory Board

Montague was on active duty in the Pentagon and so I had to call him Colonel on the telephone. I asked him about administrative order No. 32 dated November 1st, 1946. As I first read it, it seemed to me that his plan for a "chief and four assistants" had got through the Intelligence Advisory Board's meeting on October 31st, 1946. Montague disillusioned me. As approved by the Advisory Board the administrative order was a joke. It provided that "full time" representatives might be designated by the respective members of the Advisory Board. Their work was

Defeat  
by the  
Board

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optional on their part. It was "ORE" which had to conform. The outcome was as he has explained in his "Souvenirs" as of April 15, 1947, that there was no coordinated estimating worth the name.

June 12, 1952 *Cited Barling IV/4*

Today Montague gave me a criticism of my preliminary writing in Chapter IV, Section 3, on Research and Estimates. It was to be made clear that Secretary Byrnes was not forcing the appointment of Mr. Huddle. Vandenberg had recommended Montague for the position. Colonel Wright proposed that a Foreign Service Officer come from the Department of State to direct the enlarged program in research and evaluation which they had in mind. After the appointment of Huddle, of course, his deputy had to come from some other Department. So, Montague became chief of the Intelligence Staff.

There was no personal issue between Admiral Inglis and Montague over "ORE 1." Montague agreed that the estimate had not been coordinated in accordance with the proper meaning of that word. He had the benefit of materials from other sources and the criticism of other persons also. But the estimate was essentially the product of one man's efforts. None of the departmental chiefs of intelligence had actually participated in making it.

In regard to the directive which came to Montague as Acting Head of "ORE" from Vandenberg's Executive by way of Edgar, Chief of "ICAPS," Montague stated that "ORE" had neither the persons nor the files necessary for evaluating the materials from the

evaluation  
of  
Materials  
from  
"OSO"

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Office of Special Operations and yet Colonel Dabney issued an order to "ORE." Therefore "G-2" had been evaluating or grading this material from covert sources. But "G-2" had requested that it be relieved of the work. It was not a question of reluctance at all on the part of "ORE." The Office simply was not equipped for the work at that time.

Dabney's  
Order

"ORE"  
not  
Equipped

September 22, 1952

The story from Admiral Foskett on Hillenkoetter's appointment was a bit of gossip from the Services. It was to the effect that the position of Director of Central Intelligence was open only "to an Admiral" as General Vandenberg left. The meaning of it was that since the Army had enjoyed the position the Navy should have it rather than the Department of State because it was the only high position left in Washington to which a man from the Services could go without losing his perquisites. It seemed trivial but it threw some light on the persistent efforts to make sure that the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act should have safeguards for men from the Army, the Navy or the Air Force who might take the position and then either be dismissed or returned to active duty. I asked if the State Department had made any effort to acquire the position. It was in a sense the State Department's turn. Montague replied that there had been a movement emanating from the Department of State. Bulford had called him to talk about the possibility of naming Allen W. Dulles, not a member of the State Department to be

Gossip  
about  
Hillenkoetter's  
appointment

The State  
Department's  
Turn

The  
Movement  
for  
Dulles

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Dabney  
X  
X

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sure, but as a ranking civilian. Montague told Buford that they were too late. He had seen the news from Paris in the "cable traffic"; Hillenkoetter had been assigned the job and he was endeavoring to avoid having to accept it.

Our talk centered upon Admiral Hillenkoetter's work as Director of Central Intelligence. Montague remembered that Hillenkoetter was accessible to his staff. Anybody could get into his office when necessary. In fact, said Montague, Hillenkoetter was almost too available. Montague spoke of his own experience as the representative of CIA on the Staff of the National Security Council. The Director had that position as "liaison" with the Council but he could send a deputy. Because Montague had so much experience with central intelligence from the time when he had been Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee through the time when he had assisted Admiral Souers in organizing the Central Intelligence Group, he was the natural choice for Hillenkoetter's deputy on the Staff of the National Security Council. When he was handling "estimates," said Montague, he was allowed to express opinions for the Agency from the point of view of "ONE." But when he came to other matters he did not feel that he should speak unless he had been specifically instructed by the Director. So Montague went to Hillenkoetter often with requests for such directions and received blanket authority to go ahead. Hillenkoetter would remark, "Whatever you say I will support." This, of course, said Montague, was yielding his authority as Director and in a way

Hillenkoetter  
too  
Available

Deputy  
in the  
Staff  
of the  
Council

Delegation  
of  
Decision

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which Montague thought Hillenkoetter should not have done. He should not deprecate his own decisions.

On matters of "coordinated intelligence estimates," Admiral Hillenkoetter knew very little and accordingly took little if any part in the actual construction of the estimates. But with regard to matters which came over the cables from Europe, said Montague, Hillenkoetter was unusually studious. He seemed to pore over the cables and he was always able to answer specific questions. As Montague spoke of this, and of this trait as if Hillenkoetter were the President's personal intelligence agent, I recalled Admiral Leahy's opinion of Hillenkoetter as a most skillful collector of secret intelligence.

In regard to the Intelligence Advisory Committee Montague had what seemed to me the usual remarks to make. Hillenkoetter had missed an opportunity to maintain the position which Vandenberg had established. Montague was certain that Hillenkoetter had done so in order to reduce the tempers in the Committee. I remarked that under Section 303 in the Act of 1947 Hillenkoetter seemed to be in position to have an Advisory Committee or not as he pleased. But apparently he had been stopped by the Secretaries in the National Security Council itself, as was their legal right. Montague felt however that Hillenkoetter might have dealt in a more forceful manner even with the Counsel which he was obliged to have. Montague spoke of one meeting of the "IAC" when he was present. Hillenkoetter stated



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his position and then maintained a rather stubborn and silent attitude. The result was that one after another of those present tried to start some discussion and could not make it go.

Chairmanship  
of the  
Committee

Then we talked about the revision of "NSCID 1" in July 1949. It made Hillenkoetter chairman as well as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Montague pointed out that in theory this was a setback for Hillenkoetter. As a member and chairman of the Committee, the Director was only one of the Group rather than the superior who could call upon the representative members of the committee for advice as he saw fit.

October 30, 1952

The Attitude  
of  
Military Men

Our discussion today was in connection with Montague's criticism of paragraphs in Chapter VI, Section V, on the "Joint Chiefs and Civilians." He remarked that the military men considered the Central Intelligence Group as if it had inherited the role of "R & A" from the old Office of Strategic Services. Contributions from the Group were to be used by the Joint Intelligence Committee about as it pleased. The Group was a "servant" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the days of the war, of course, "OSS" was directly under the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Group  
as  
servant

The  
Joint  
Intelligence  
Group

Montague explained to me the organization of the Joint Intelligence Group within the Joint Staff under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Intelligence Group, he said, had "no mind of its own." It was composed of men from the respective Services but

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others in those Services knew that they could go directly past the men in the Group to their respective chiefs of intelligence. He said also that the Services seemed to be as jealous of "JIC" as they were of "CIA."

Civilian  
representative  
in the  
Joint  
Intelligence  
Committee

We talked then of Hillenkoetter's effort to maintain representation for the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission in the Joint Intelligence Committee, even if he were to take an inferior position for himself personally. It was clear to Montague that if he had done so Hillenkoetter would have gone right to the old position of "OSS." Hillenkoetter would have sat at the "foot of the table." He would not have been the Coordinator but again a "servant."

General  
Gruenther's  
Words  
and  
Thoughts

I asked what seemed to be in General Gruenther's mind when he spoke of certain documents belonging to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as not available to the Central Intelligence Agency. Montague's answer was that the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee were documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They could be considered as unfinished materials which could not be released without the consent of the Joint Chiefs. He said also that possibly Gruenther was talking about a different kind of intelligence which might be named "information from abroad." Just what the difference was between foreign intelligence and such information I could not discern.

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November 6, 1952

I called Montague on the telephone with regard to statements in the McNarney Report (NSC 50). The Dulles Committee had concluded that the Director of Central Intelligence should bring the Intelligence Advisory Committee more actively into coordinating intelligence activities and approving intelligence estimates, and that the members of the Advisory Committee should be collectively responsible. The resulting estimates therefore would be "coordinated national estimates." I asked Montague if I might say that the concept of the Advisory Committee was undergoing change in 1949.

Originally, I thought that the concept (NIA 1) had been that the Advisory Board was to act in that capacity on matters generally as the Director of Central Intelligence needed advice. It seemed to me that few if any thought at that time of national estimating as it is being done today.

Montague corrected me. The original concept of "JIC" in wartime, he said, was one of coordination and that concept was in Souers' mind when they drafted NIA 1 in February, 1946. I recalled that he as chief of the Reports Staff wished to establish an estimating branch. He elaborated the point that he had expected its estimates to be finished or practically so at the working level. Then those estimates would go up to the Intelligence Advisory Board and there the chiefs of intelligence constituting it might offer objections. But the expectation was that the chiefs usually would accept an estimate because their own

The  
Dulles  
and  
McNarney  
Reports

The Original  
Concept  
of  
Coordination  
in  
Estimating

Expectations  
of the  
Central Reports  
Staff

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Response  
of the  
Departmental  
Chiefs  
King and Council"

representatives had worked upon it at the lower level with the chief of the Reports Staff. Montague said that the Director was to be separate from his Advisory Board but that he would sit with them, as it were, like the British "King and Council." The Director would have "individual responsibility," possibly completely so. The members of the Advisory Board would offer substantial dissents.

disappearance  
of the  
original Concept

The Effect  
of  
New Men

The men who took over the Agency and its reorganization under the National Security Act, said Montague, were unfamiliar with the original plans. Admiral Inghis was still on the Advisory Committee, and he remembered his objection to "ORR 1" in the fall of 1946. But new men were in charge during the Dulles and McNarney episodes. It is Montague's opinion that the original plan for "coordinated national estimates" disappeared. It was reappearing in 1949. He considered that the present concept of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as an estimating board with collective responsibility for approving all of the estimates made within the Agency had developed to its accepted position after General Smith became Director of Central Intelligence.

General  
Smith  
as  
King in Council"

With this concept there had grown to full stature what had always been present in law, that is, acceptance of the Director of Central Intelligence as "King." General Smith sits with the Advisory Committee; he knows that he has to rely upon them for the resources of intelligence; he accepts their discussion and he may be influenced by it. But Smith can and he does form his own estimate. I wondered as I listened to Montague's

TOP SECRET

explanation what Vandenberg would think of this development. Probably he knew very well that it was happening. [See the interview with him regarding the responsibility of the Director, March 17, 1952.]

Coordination  
in  
Estimating  
by  
Mail

As we closed this discussion Montague told me of the reluctance on the part of the representatives of the old Advisory Board. They did not want to participate in estimating. They asked if they might not do so by mail. It was the Intelligence Advisory Board, he said, which dragged its feet in 1946 and 1947.

March 23, 1953

*cited Darling*  
*III*

Baldwin's  
Article  
in  
October, 1947

Montague did not recall Hans<sup>2</sup> Baldwin's article of October 16, 1947. The illustrations indicated to him that he had never seen it. But the material in it, he said, was generally known and discussed within the Agency at that time. This was the article which Blum said had influenced him to suggest to Secretary Forrestal some investigation of the intelligence system.

Babbitt  
and  
Hunter

Montague's memory of the events in the fall of 1947 is confined primarily to matters of ORE. Babbitt had taken charge in the summer. The controversies of the preceding year were continuing. Montague was in the Global Survey Group, waiting for Babbitt to solve the problems created by the chiefs of the Geographical Divisions, still led by Hunter. According to Montague's memory, Babbitt was at a disadvantage because he had been considered for a position under Hunter in the Western Europe Branch. Hunter had opposed the appointment. I asked if Babbitt knew that Hunter had

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opposed. Montague was quite sure that Babbitt did. Babbitt said nothing to me about it the other day when we talked over Eddy's interest in his appointment as Assistant Director of the Office of Reports and Estimates. In my opinion, Babbitt did not tell me because he did not wish to give the impression of being hostile to Hunter because Hunter had opposed him.

This was not mere gossip. Babbitt's difficulties with the men around him contributed to his hesitancy to "get tough," as he said he should have done. Captain McCollum, naturally enough, was somewhat disappointed that he was not made Assistant Director when Huddle left. No doubt McCollum behaved properly, but the fact must have added to Babbitt's reluctance. Moreover, Babbitt was opposed in the Department of State which he was expected to represent in the Agency as Assistant Director of "ORE." It was more than a year before he got a higher rating from the State Department. In fact, if I recall, he did not receive the P-8 until after he had gone on the "payroll of the Agency." So, he came with a rating lower than several of the men who were under him in ORE. He certainly did not represent "G-2" even though he had spent some years in that service during the war. And finally, Eddy left the Department of State; the one who had sponsored Babbitt's appointment to the Agency was gone. It was not surprising that he had difficulty with both his subordinates and his own will power.

Babbitt's  
Predicament

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Montague spent an afternoon in 1948 with Mr. H. Jackson discussing what was wrong in ORE with respect to estimating, coordinating, research and evaluation, and the familiar problems.

Jackson  
and  
Montague

Montague recalled the chief difficulty as one of personnel. If the men had been able to get along with one another and "cooperate," he said, almost any system could have been made to work well enough.

Personnel  
the  
Chief Difficulty

This meant to me that the quarreling of the previous year went on and on. Babbitt would have had to dismiss some of his subordinates to stop it.

We talked at length about the section in the Comments by ORE upon the Dulles Report, pages 6-7, concerning the Estimates Division and the Research and Reports Division. This section was used by Hillenkoetter in the Comments of the Agency on page 21.

"ORE"  
on the  
Dulles Report

Montague explained the discussion within ORE in which he took strong exception to the position of the Office. He said that I should get Lewis Stevens' original draft. It would show, in comparison with the Report of the Office and the Comments of the Agency, how Stevens and Babbitt held to their position with regard to the necessity of research divisions in the Office. In this whole controversy is, of course, the ceaseless friction between the Geographical Branches and the Estimating Group (the old Intelligence Staff).

Necessity  
for  
Research  
Divisions

During this conversation I asked that we set aside the politics and other factors of the moment and discuss on its merits whether an estimating staff needed to have a research group within

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"ONE"  
and  
"ORR"

its own organization. I gathered that Montague thought it unnecessary if the departmental intelligence agencies surveyed their materials, the product of their own research, to the estimating group in the Agency. He said that they were doing so fairly well today for CIA. But he said also that, of course, the estimating group needed to have a small staff of researchers immediately available. For one obvious reason, this is necessary to save time in case some one of the estimators wishes to have the information before him verified or modified by other factors, suspect or known.

Montague did not think that ORR had to be in this Agency. It could be, he said, another agency provided that its materials were immediately available. In short, ORR did not have to be under the administration of CIA.

This led us to talk about Vandenberg's argument for establishing ONE in the first place (summer of 1946). Montague remarked that Vandenberg had other reasons besides those which he specified, but Montague did not indicate them. From my memory of what Vandenberg said to me, I concluded that he was having great difficulty in persuading the departmental agencies to send their information to the Group. Today, said Montague, there was much more "cooperation." Possibly it was to be ascribed to General Smith's genius. I was inclined to think that his rank also had something to do with it. Montague spoke often of the Estimates Production Board. It apparently was established, December 27, 1949, as a result of the Dulles Report. I was not sufficiently informed

Vandenberg's  
Establishment  
of  
"ORR"

Smith's  
Genius  
and  
Rank



~~TOP SECRET~~

about it to understand all that he said. At the moment it seemed to me that it was the predecessor of OMB within the jurisdiction of ORL.

Montague was much interested in the Eberstadt Report. He did not recall ever having seen a copy. I showed him the one which Todd sent to the Agency in December 1946; particularly the recommendation (p. 49) that there should be an Intelligence Evaluation Board. This, I said, looked to me very much like Montague's own suggestion in the spring of 1946. He said that it seemed so to him. I asked if he knew why the Eberstadt Report had been kept in the shadow as it were of the Dulles Report which followed it and which quoted it with respect to a "civilian DCI." It seemed to me that the findings of the Eberstadt Report were as significant; they might well have had some influence upon Smith, Langer, and others who initiated the reforms after General Smith became DCI. Montague was interested in the idea but did not know much about the Eberstadt Commission and Report.

There was no time to ask questions about scientific intelligence, Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense, the Webb Plan, and many other things which I wanted to discuss with him. We continued our talk at lunch on lesser matters. One major point Montague stressed again and again as a matter of practical politics. Personalities entered constantly into an argument. If a certain person supported the measure, you could expect half a dozen others to line up against him. If one's "rice bowl" were in

~~TOP SECRET~~

The  
Eberstadt  
Report

Recommendation  
of an  
Intelligence  
Evaluation  
Board

Personalities  
and  
Argument

One's  
"Rice Bowl"

[REDACTED]

danger of being shattered, he said, you could count upon that person to make sturdy and often in envious arguments for maintaining the organization. He said that I should talk with Van Slyck about the Special Staff which Babbitt created to handle "Korea." Montague himself was on duty in the Pentagon at that time.

[REDACTED]